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Collecting personal data is a feature of daily life. Businesses, advertisers, 
agencies, and law enforcement officers amass massive reservoirs of our per-
sonal data. This state of affairs—what I am calling the “collection impera-
tive”—is justified in the name of efficiency, convenience, and security. The un-
bridled collection of personal data, however, leads to abuses. Public and 
private entities have disproportionate power over individuals and groups 
whose information they have amassed. Nowhere is that power disparity more 
evident than the State’s surveillance of the indigent. Poor mothers in particu-
lar have vanishingly little privacy. Whether or not poor mothers receive subsi-
dized prenatal care, the existential state of poor mothers is persistent and in-
discriminate State surveillance. 
Professor Khiara Bridges’s book, The Poverty of Privacy Rights, advances 
the project of securing privacy for the most vulnerable among us. It argues 
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that poor mothers have a constitutional right not to be known if the State’s da-
ta collection efforts demean and humiliate them for no legitimate purpose. This 
Book Review situates the book’s contributions in light of another era’s due 
process revolution. Fifty years ago, Professor Charles Reich’s scholarship 
provided a theory for why government entitlements for the poor deserved the 
same protection as those provided the wealthy. His scholarship fundamentally 
changed the way the Supreme Court understood the procedural due process 
rights of the poor. Now, as then, Professor Bridges’s scholarship has the po-
tential to transform our conception of substantive due process protections for 
indigent mothers. 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights provides an important lens for rethinking the 
data collection imperative more generally. It supplies a theory not only on 
which a constitutional right to information privacy can be built but also on 
which positive law and norms can develop. Concepts of reciprocity may pro-
vide another analytical tool to understand a potential right to be as unknown 
to government as it is to us. 
INTRODUCTION 
Collecting personal data is a feature of daily life.1 Businesses collect mas-
sive amounts of information about consumers’ likes and dislikes, strengths and 
weaknesses.2 Online behavioral advertisers have copious records of individu-
als’ searches, purchases, musings, and wish lists.3 Law enforcement aggregates 
video streams from public and private security cameras, images from license-
plate readers, and data from government and private databases.4 Federal and 
state agencies amass dossiers on individuals in connection with decisions about 
employment, licenses, contracts, public benefits, travel, and taxes.5 
 
1 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY 
OF EVERYDAY LIFE 1 (2012) (“Over the last two decades, the rapid evolution of networked 
information and communication technologies has catalyzed equally rapid change in the or-
ganization of economic and social activity.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: 
The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 241, 244 (2007) (“Today, databases of personal identifying information in the private 
sector ensure the seamless flow of commerce.”). 
2 See JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING, 
STRIP YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 1-3 (2017); Ryan M. Calo, Digital Manipu-
lation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995 (2014) (“Today’s companies fastidiously study 
consumers and, increasingly, personalize every aspect of the consumer experience.”). 
3 See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS 
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORLD 1 (2011). 
4 See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 62, 66 (2013) (explaining that law enforcement aggregates and analyzes video 
streams to create 24/7 surveillance systems). 
5 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 2-3 (2004) (“[A]n ever-growing series of records is created about almost 
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This state of affairs—what I am calling the “collection imperative”—is jus-
tified in the name of efficiency, convenience, and security.6 Retailers recom-
mend gifts based on the recipients’ online activities.7 Startups promise to use 
our genetic data to personalize dining options and family planning.8 Law en-
forcement tracks individuals who have been flagged as likely to commit 
crimes.9 Federal agencies assign “risk assessment scores” to travelers.10 
American law has largely tolerated this approach. In the United States, in-
formation privacy law generally focuses on the transparency, security, and dis-
closure of personal data.11 The general assumption is that the collection of per-
sonal data is optimal for social welfare.12 Everyone is better off if gifts are 
enjoyed, diseases are prevented, and criminals are caught, terrorists are stopped 
from flying, and citizens are provided with appropriate services. At most, the 
law addresses downstream problems associated with databases of personal da-
ta.13 
 
every facet of a person’s life. As businesses and the government increasingly share personal 
information, digital dossiers about nearly every individual are being assembled.”). 
6 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 19 (2014) (arguing that big data devel-
opments are allowing problems to be viewed in new light); Jonathan Shaw, Why Big Data Is 
a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2014), https://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-
data-is-a-big-deal [https://perma.cc/7XPW-KB5T] (arguing that big data is justified on 
grounds that it creates innovative solutions to societal problems).  
7 See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 6 (explaining that companies “make purchase suggestions 
based on the prior interests of one customer as compared to millions of others”). 
8 Alexandra Ossola, These DNA Diet Apps Want to Rule Your Health, WIRED, (May 1, 
2017, 12:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/2017/05/these-dna-diet-apps-want-to-rule-your-
health/. 
9 See ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, 
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 8-9 (2017). 
10 EPIC v. CBP (Analytical Framework for Intelligence), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/afi/#documents [https://perma.cc/9S22-4SAK] (explaining that 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Analytical Framework for Intelligence uses personal-
ly identifiable information from government and private data sources to identify threats to 
security); see U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLIGENCE 1-2 (2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_cbp_afi_june_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6EV8-ND5Y] (explaining methods used by Customs and Border Protec-
tion to assess individuals for risk). 
11 See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 763 (2016). 
12 See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 382-83 (2016) 
(“[I]ncreased processing and use of personal data is inevitable and offers enormous value to 
society.”). 
13 Cf. id. at 383 (“Ideally, privacy law seeks to maximize [benefits of data collection] and 
reduce risks of harm, of course. When it comes to governing data processing and use, this 
balance is not always so easy to achieve.”). 
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The unbridled collection of personal data, however, can and does lead to 
abuses. Government and businesses obtain disproportionate power over indi-
viduals and groups whose information they have amassed.14 As Neil Richards 
and Woodrow Hartzog explain, individuals are “vastly less powerful than the 
government and corporate institutions that create and control digital technolo-
gies and the personal data on which those technologies run.”15 
Nowhere is that power disparity more evident than the State’s surveillance 
of society’s most vulnerable members. The poor, unlike the affluent, are sub-
ject to unlimited state surveillance.16 The merger of big data and law enforce-
ment results in persistent, indiscriminate surveillance of poor communities.17 
Public benefits programs subject the poor to ever more intrusive and demean-
ing interrogations and inspections.18 A recent example is Wisconsin’s manda-
tory drug testing of food-stamp recipients.19 
When it comes to poor mothers specifically, the State’s data collection ef-
forts are boundless and inescapable.20 If poor mothers obtain government assis-
tance for medical care, every aspect of their life is interrogated, and every data 
point is collected.21 On the other hand, if poor mothers decline to pursue Medi-
caid benefits to protect their privacy, the State’s child protective services train 
their eyes on them.22 As a result, poor mothers find themselves under state sur-
veillance whether or not they receive government-funded prenatal care.23 
 
14 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936-37 
(2013) (explaining how government and business obtain data for “purposes of influence, 
management, protection or direction.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
15 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 
1180, 1183 (2017). 
16 See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 2-3 (2001). 
17 Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
1389, 1389-90 (2012) (“[The poor] endure a barrage of information-collection practices that 
are far more invasive and degrading than those experienced by their wealthier neighbors.”); 
see also FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 47, 73-76 (explaining that “predictive policing” meth-
ods use criteria that adversely affect poor communities). 
18 See GILLIOM, supra note 16, at 1-5 (describing how monitoring systems associated 
with welfare programs allow welfare and law enforcement authorities to routinely conduct 
surveillance of poor individuals).  
19 Jim Cole, Scott Walker Moves Forward with Plan to Drug Test Food Stamp Users, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-walker-moves-
forward-with-plan-drug-test-food-stamp-users/ [https://perma.cc/3T3B=7DJB]. 
20 See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 1-5 (2017). 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 1-2, 115-116 (explaining that criteria for what constitutes child abuse defines 
many attributes that are essentially synonymous with being poor, thereby forcing pregnant 
mothers to either accept state aid or run risk of committing child neglect). 
23 See id. at 148-49. 
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Professor Khiara Bridges’s book, The Poverty of Privacy Rights, is an im-
portant step in developing “a bill of rights for the disinherited.”24 Building on 
her findings in Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a Site of 
Racialization,25 Professor Bridges explains that state surveillance of poor 
mothers is premised on the moral construction of poverty rather than on legit-
imate concerns about prenatal care or successful parenting. Poor mothers are 
subjected to invasive state surveillance because their character is seen as defec-
tive and norm-breaking.26 The Poverty of Privacy Rights contends that the con-
stitutional right to information privacy should be understood to limit the State’s 
collection of personal data from poor mothers.27 Recognizing a zone of privacy 
is essential for a poor mother’s dignity, autonomy, and capacity for self-
governance.28 
This Book Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the central argu-
ments and contributions of The Privacy of Poverty Rights. Part II situates the 
book’s contributions in light of another era’s due process revolution. Fifty 
years ago, Professor Charles Reich’s scholarship provided a theory for why 
government entitlements for the poor and the wealthy equally deserved protec-
tion.29 His scholarship fundamentally changed the way the Supreme Court un-
derstood the procedural due process rights of the poor.30 Professor Bridges’s 
scholarship has the potential to transform our conception of substantive due 
process protections for indigent mothers. Part II also sketches out a reform 
agenda that reaches beyond the Constitution. Part III frames the book’s contri-
butions in light of broader concerns about technologies of perfect surveillance. 
It extends the conversation to concepts of reciprocity and a potential right to be 
as unknown to government as it is to us. 
I. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND POOR MOTHERS 
Poor mothers have vanishingly little privacy. In exchange for government 
assistance with prenatal care, the State demands information about every detail 
of poor mothers’ lives. It collects information about poor mothers’ life experi-
 
24 Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1257 (1965). 
25 See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011). 
26 See infra Section I.A (describing invasive assessments that State requires poor mothers 
to undergo when seeking healthcare). 
27 See infra Section I.B (considering State’s surveillance of poor mothers in light of Su-
preme Court’s recognition of right to privacy). 
28 See infra notes 108-109, 164and accompanying text (explaining that privacy fosters 
autonomy, dignity, and self-governance). 
29 See infra Section II.A (describing influence of Professor Charles Reich’s The New 
Property). 
30 See infra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court cited Reich’s 
work in deciding scope of due process property rights). 
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ences, bodies, and homes.31 The Poverty of Privacy Rights explores the harm 
of such surveillance and why the Constitution should be understood to limit the 
State’s data collection practices. This Part highlights the book’s contribution to 
our understanding of the moral foundation and legal significance of the State’s 
surveillance of poor mothers. 
A. Dispossession 
When pregnant women seek government assistance for medical care, the 
State demands a dizzying array of personal information.32 In addition to the 
expected health exams to determine pregnant women’s physical health, state 
Medicaid rules require assessments of their “nutritional status, health education 
status, and psychosocial status.”33 Data is collected about poor pregnant wom-
en’s “formal education and reading level,” “religious and cultural influences,” 
“history of previous pregnancies,” “general emotional status and history,” 
“wanted or unwanted pregnancy,” “personal adjustment to pregnancy,” “sub-
stance use and abuse,” “housing/household,” and “education/employment.”34 
Poor mothers are interrogated about topics that have little to no connection 
with their physical health, the well-being of the fetus, or their ability to par-
ent.35 The State’s questions vary from the quotidian to the highly sensitive. 
Was the pregnancy planned?36 How many sexual partners has she had?37 What 
are her strategies for preventing future pregnancies?38 Has she ever had any 
marital or family problems?39 Has she ever experienced sexual assault or do-
mestic violence?40 Has she ever been homeless?41 Has she ever struggled with 
mental illness?42 Has she ever used drugs or alcohol?43 Has she ever ex-
 
31 See infra notes 37-48- and accompanying text (describing inquiries State poses to poor 
mothers during medical assessments). 
32 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 1-2 (listing numerous assessments required before 
pregnant women receive medical care under California’s Medicaid regulations). 
33 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 
§ 51348(e)(1)(A) (2012)). 
34 Id. at 2, 111 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 51348(e)(1)(A) (2012)). 
35 See id. at 111-12, 164-66 (characterizing interrogations as social interventions rather 
than physical assessments). 
36 Id. at 111 (“Poor pregnant women in New York must . . . undergo[] a screening that 
asks about the unplanned-ness and/or unwantedness of the current pregnancy . . . .”). 
37 See id. at 166 (discussing poor pregnant women being forced to answer questions 
about “sexual adventurous[ness]”). 
38 Id. at 7 (discussing “inquiries about women’s . . . strategies for preventing the concep-
tion and birth of more children”). 
39 Id. at 111. 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. (“Poor pregnant women in New York must . . . undergo[] a screening that asks 
about . . . [their] history of psychiatric treatment or emotional disturbance . . . .”). 
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changed sex for money or gifts?44 What is her highest level of education?45 
Was she ever expelled from high school?46 Has she ever been arrested or con-
victed of a crime?47 Has she ever been found guilty of possessing contra-
band?48 
As Professor Bridges explains, the State’s interrogations are rooted in the 
moral construction of poverty.49 Under that construction, the pregnant mother’s 
defective character is the cause of her indigence.50 Race contributes to this 
construction—racial minorities are disproportionately represented among the 
poor.51 As President Ronald Reagan made famous with his description of the 
“welfare queen,” indigent black motherhood is caricatured as sexually irre-
sponsible, lazy, and deviant.52 
The State’s interrogations reflect the moral construction of poverty by at-
taching “pathology . . . to poor bodies.”53 Why would the State demand infor-
mation about a poor mother’s history with abortion, prostitution, school expul-
sion, criminality, sexual abuse, mental illness, and homelessness if not for the 
State’s belief that she is a person of defective character? The State’s questions 
say that poor mothers are the type of people who abuse drugs, sell sex, commit 
crimes, and engage in behavior that would warrant suspension from school.54 
Because a poor mother’s poverty is taken to suggest a flawed character that 
may cause her to mistreat her child, the State “always has the authority to in-
fringe” her privacy.55 
 
43 Id. at 166 (noting that poor pregnant women are often asked whether they have “been 
addicted to drugs” or “abused alcohol”).  
44 Id. at 174 (“She may have to reveal that she has broken moral norms dictating that 
sexual intercourse . . . should never be exchanged for money or gifts.”). 
45 Id. at 167. 
46 Id. at 166. 
47 See id. at 167 (arguing that poor mothers should not have to answer questions regard-
ing “punishment by the criminal justice system”). 
48 Id. at 166. 
49 See id. at 113 (“[The State’s interrogations] reveal that poor women are less valuable 
members of the body politic.”). 
50 See id. at 7 (discussing how moral construction of poverty leads to “idea that people 
are poor because something is wrong with them”). 
51 See id. at 33 (“It is easy to moralize poverty when those who are disproportionately 
impoverished are racial Others.”). 
52 See id. at 54 (discussing how President Reagan’s stories of “welfare queen” reflected 
“a culture wherein black people have been constructed as sexually lascivi-
ous[,] . . . intractably indolent” and “apotheosis of immorality”). 
53 Id. at 113. 
54 See id. at 149 (noting that “the pursuit of full information about an individual poor 
mother would not even be attempted without the baseline supposition about the group to 
which she belongs”). 
55 Id. at 114 (emphasis in original). 
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Evidence that the State’s surveillance of poor mothers has fulfilled its stated 
goal to protect children is scant. State surveillance has, however, resulted in 
grave harm to children. In a recent case, state workers placed a newborn into 
foster care based on concerns that the mother’s poverty would prevent her 
from providing basic necessities for her child.56 The infant died roughly three 
months later while in foster care.57 The foster parents could have prevented the 
baby’s death with a firm mattress.58 
As The Poverty of Privacy Rights illuminates, the State’s interrogations 
strike a powerful blow to poor mothers’ sense of self-worth. The State’s mes-
sage is that poor mothers “do not have equal standing in the nation’s cultural 
imagination.”59 Rather than equal citizens of the state, they are subjects of a 
state that sees them as a social problem.60 The State’s interrogations suggest 
that uninsured mothers are diseased, broken, and incompetent, whereas insured 
mothers are told no such thing.61 They say that poor mothers’ destructive 
tendencies must be tracked to prevent harm to their children.62 The state’s 
“dignity-harming interrogations . . . insult poor pregnant women” and construct 
them as “second-class citizens.”63 
The State’s collection imperative carries downstream risks. Information 
stored in government databases is notoriously insecure.64 The State’s digital 
 
56 Mark Douglas, Pinellas Parents Bury Newborn Who Died in Pasco Foster Care, 
WFLA (Nov. 7, 2017, 6:21 PM), http://wfla.com/2017/11/07/pinellas-parents-bury-newborn 
-who-died-in-pasco-foster-care/ [perma.cc/C4GJ-LHBX]. 
57 Id. (reporting that baby was placed in foster care after July 29, 2017, and died on Oc-
tober 24, 2017).  
58 See id. (noting that foster parents “failed to follow [foster care agency’s] baby safety 
checklist that says all infants should sleep in a crib with a firm mattress and tight-fitting 
sheets without other materials that might suffocate a baby” and instead put baby to sleep in 
adult bed). 
59 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 113. 
60 Id. at 7-8 (“If personal failures are the presumptive cause of poverty, then poor moth-
ers ought to be supervised closely, as their personal failures necessarily implicate children.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
61 Id. at 149 (noting different ways that mothers are treated based on financial condi-
tions). 
62 See id. at 12 (arguing that “if poor mothers have not been given privacy rights . . . be-
cause their behavioral or ethical flaws necessarily implicate children, these flaws would also 
explain why have [sic] been given ineffective privacy rights”). 
63 Id. at 121. 
64 The breach of the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) is a prominent 
example of the vulnerability of government databases. See Maria Korolov, The OPM Data 
Breach 2 Years On: What Government Agencies Must Do Now, CSO (June 20, 2017, 3:00 
AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3201041/data-breach/the-opm-data-breach-2-years 
-on-what-government-agencies-must-do-now.html [perma.cc/SQZ2-K2U4] (discussing af-
termath of OPM breach, which left vulnerable nearly twenty-two million Social Security 
numbers, over one million fingerprints, and individuals’ criminal and financial histories). 
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dossiers about poor mothers may be subject to data leaks and hacks.65 A com-
mon source of data breaches involves public hospitals where the personal data 
of poor mothers is collected and stored.66 Personal data extracted from poor 
pregnant women could be used to create risk profiles that could justify search-
es of their homes in the name of child protection. Government-generated risk 
profiles, in turn, can result in what Professor Margaret Hu has aptly called “Big 
Data Blacklisting.”67 Risk profiles can be shared with a host of federal and 
state agencies, impacting poor mothers’ opportunities, from government em-
ployment to immigration.68 
Poor mothers cannot avoid state surveillance by declining to seek govern-
ment-assisted prenatal care. When the State learns that uninsured pregnant 
women are not getting prenatal care, it commences surveillance.69 If a poor 
woman comes to a hospital for delivery and she has not been receiving prenatal 
care, then the hospital will likely hold the infant until the state inspects the 
mother’s home.70 Child protective services will interrogate the mother to de-
termine her competence to raise children absent the State’s intervention and 
 
65 Cf. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data 
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 747-73 (2018) (discussing prevalence of data breaches 
today and judicial system’s difficulty in identifying their harm). 
66 See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT iv 
(2016) (noting that in California sixteen percent of breaches were within healthcare sector 
and involving medical information, including patient records and Social Security numbers); 
Citron, supra note 11, at 786-88 (discussing state attorney general’s offices’ responses to 
consumer privacy issues and noting that health privacy and data security are areas of focus 
for Massachusetts and Connecticut attorney general’s offices given “outgrowth of the high 
concentration of hospitals and insurance companies within their borders”). 
67 Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2016) (“‘Big data 
blacklisting’ is the process of categorizing individuals as administratively ‘guilty until prov-
en innocent’ by virtue of suspicious digital data and database screening results.”). 
68 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011); Gray & Citron, supra note 4, 
at 80-81 (“Governmental data-mining systems have flagged innocent individuals as persons 
of interest, leading to their erroneous classifications as terrorists or security threats, intense 
scrutiny at airports, denial of travel, false arrest, and loss of public benefits.”). 
69 See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L.  & 
GENDER 113, 124-133 (2011) (discussing New York State Prenatal Care Assistance Pro-
gram and noting that to receive benefits, women are required to divulge information regard-
ing recent nutritional intake and undergo examinations including psychological assess-
ments). 
70 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 9; see also id. at 131 (“The failure to receive prenatal 
care is a form of ‘neglect,’ and that justifies the state’s intervention into the family to ‘pro-
tect’ the child.”). 
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regulation.71 The State presumes that if poor mothers lack insurance, they can-
not provide basic necessities for their children.72 
In short, the existential state of poor mothers is one of unavoidable state 
surveillance. If poor mothers accept government assistance for medical care, 
they lose their privacy. If poor mothers do not obtain Medicaid, they lose their 
privacy.73 The “legal and social condition of poor mothers is one that is devoid 
of privacy—one in which state power surrounds them at all times, without re-
gard to whether they receive public benefits.”74 
Poor mothers are denied privacy because the State assumes nothing valuable 
will come from their freedom from surveillance.75 The State subjects poor 
mothers to surveillance because it views their character as suspicious.76 Poor 
mothers are denied the “right to an inviolate personality,” as Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis articulated the concept of privacy in their famous law re-
view article The Right to Privacy.77 State surveillance is designed to bring poor 
mothers “away from the margins of thought and behavior and toward the 
mainstream.”78 As Professor Bridges explains, the poor mother’s lack of priva-
cy is “not a function of [her] dependence on state aid; it is a function of [her] 
poverty.”79 
B. Due Process Turn 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights considers the State’s surveillance of poor 
mothers in light of a series of cases in which the Supreme Court has tentatively 
recognized a constitutional right to information privacy.80 In Whalen v. Roe,81 
the Court raised the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause protects individuals against the improper collection, aggregation, or 
disclosure of their private information.82 In Whalen, a group of patients and 
 
71 See id. at 10 (noting that if poor mothers refuse government assistance, they will still 
lose their privacy “because they will be unable to provide their children with basic necessi-
ties, thus making them vulnerable to a privacy-invading investigation”). 
72 See id. at 9-10. 
73 Id. at 131. 
74 Id. at 10. 
75 Id. at 153 (“We want to prevent [poor mothers] from experimenting with behaviors 
that are unpopular or countercultural, as we do not trust that anything valuable will result 
from their experimentation.”). 
76 See id. at 154 (“[D]enying poor mothers privacy is a mechanism for bringing a prob-
lematized segment of society into conformity.”). 
77 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
211 (1890). 
78 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 154. 
79 Id. at 132. 
80 See id. at 157-58. 
81 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
82 Id. at 598-600. 
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doctors challenged a New York statute requiring the centralized collection of 
the names and addresses of individuals taking “Schedule II” drugs, for which 
there were legal and illegal markets.83 The goal of the database was to help the 
State detect the diversion of drugs into illegal markets.84 Plaintiffs argued the 
law illegitimately burdened their “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”85 
In Whalen, the Court set the stage for the recognition of a right to infor-
mation privacy: “The cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ 
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the 
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”86 The 
Court acknowledged: “the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive 
government files” arising from the “collection of taxes, the distribution of wel-
fare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction 
of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws.”87 
The Court began by noting that the State’s collection of prescription data 
was an “essential part of modern medical practice” though it did risk stigmatiz-
ing patients.88 The Court upheld the statute, finding the State’s interest in de-
tecting drug crimes outweighed the Plaintiffs’ privacy interest, because the 
Plaintiffs’ data was adequately secured.89 According to Justice Brennan’s con-
currence, had there been a real risk of disclosure to unauthorized individuals, 
the State’s amassing of Plaintiffs’ health data might have raised constitutional 
concerns.90 The Court also noted the absence of evidence suggesting that the 
State’s data collection chilled Plaintiffs from taking medicine.91 
Since Whalen, the Supreme Court has suggested twice that a substantive due 
process right to informational privacy exists, but the law challenged in each 
case did not violate this right because safeguards prevented the unwarranted 
disclosure of personal information.92 In National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
 
83 Id. at 595. 
84 Id. at 591-92.  
85 Id. at 599. 
86 Id. at 599-600. 
87 Id. at 605. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan similarly warned that “central storage 
and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that 
information . . . .” Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
88 Id. at 602 (majority opinion). 
89 Id. at 601-02 (noting that there is only “remote possibility” that the information will be 
inadequately protected, which is “not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire patient-
identification program”). 
90 Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
91 Id. at 604 (majority opinion). 
92 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 157-58 (discussing Nixon v. GSA and NASA v. Nelson). 
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ministration v. Nelson,93 low risk contract employees at a government labora-
tory challenged background checks that required them to answer questions 
about their emotional health, drug treatment, and psychological counseling.94 
In Nelson, the Court held that the government’s interests in managing its op-
erations, combined with protections to secure the information, satisfied plain-
tiffs’ “‘interest in avoiding disclosure’ that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in 
the Constitution.’”95 The Court underscored that the Privacy Act of 1974 ade-
quately protected plaintiffs’ information by requiring their written consent be-
fore disclosing it to third parties and by imposing criminal penalties for the un-
authorized disclosure of their information.96 
Beyond the Supreme Court, lower courts have recognized a constitutional 
right to information privacy where the State has inappropriately disclosed indi-
viduals’ personal data.97 Some circuits have protected information implicating 
fundamental rights like family relationships, procreation, and contraception.98 
Others have protected information about which individuals enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.99 
For the most part, courts have refused to acknowledge—let alone balance—
the harm caused by the State’s collection of personal information.100 Consider 
a due process challenge to a state law that required parents receiving govern-
ment funding for childcare to submit finger scans when dropping off and pick-
ing up their children.101 In that case, the Plaintiff argued that submitting her 
finger scan in front of other parents and teachers was humiliating because it 
marked her as a welfare recipient.102 The Court refused to consider the stigma 
 
93 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
94 Id. at 138. 
95 Id. at 138 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599). 
96 Id. at 147. 
97 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 158 (“Although the Supreme Court has never announced 
definitively that a right to information privacy exists, the circuits have trudged ahead and 
recognized the right.”). Courts generally engage in a balancing of interests to determine 
whether the government’s interest is sufficiently important and narrowly tailored to compel 
the collection of personal data. Id. There is some variance among the circuits, however, as to 
whether burdens on this right are reviewed on the intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny 
standard. See id. 
98 Id. (“Some circuits only protect the privacy of information that implicates fundamental 
rights . . . .”). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 158 (arguing that current culture of blaming poor mothers for their situation has 
led to failure by courts to properly balance between privacy interest of individual and inter-
est of government). 
101 Id. at 159-60 (discussing how Williams v. Berry, 977 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D. Miss. 
2013) failed to appreciate mother’s interest in privacy). 
102 Id. at 159 (“[B]ecause only beneficiaries of the Mississippi Child Care Payment Pro-
gram were required to use the finger scanning technology, her status as a program benefi-
ciary was disclosed to all those around her whenever she used the technology . . . .”). 
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caused by the State’s collection efforts as implicating the constitutional right to 
information privacy.103 For the Court, only the State’s disclosure of the Plain-
tiff’s finger scans to unauthorized third parties would implicate the right to in-
formation privacy.104 
Professor Bridges offers a thicker, more contextual conception of the consti-
tutional right to information privacy than courts have recognized.105 As Profes-
sor Bridges argues, courts should assess the State’s collection of individuals’ 
personal data, not just the subsequent disclosure of that personal data.106 The 
State can infringe on a person’s “right to be let alone” through its collection, 
aggregation, use, or disclosure of information.107 
Indeed, there are some aspects of a person’s life in which the government 
has no legitimate interest and whose collection undermines self-respect and au-
tonomy. Individuals have the right not to be known if the State’s questions 
would demean and humiliate them for no good reason.108 Privacy honors hu-
man dignity by conferring “respect for individual choice” and “respect for in-
dividuals because they have the capacity for choice.”109 “What makes a pursuit 
of information degrading does not turn on whether the information being pur-
sued can be linked back to a specific individual or whether it is sensitive; ra-
ther, the degrading character of the pursuit turns on the assumptions made 
about the person that are motivating the interrogation.”110 
In the case of government-funded prenatal programs, crucial aspects of the 
State’s interrogations have little to do with healthy parenting and much to do 
with the State’s ability to control and demean poor mothers.111 When the State 




105 Id. at 154 (arguing that society gives privacy rights to practices that it values and that 
by not giving poor mothers more privacy protection, society implicitly suggests that their 
lives are not socially valuable). 
106 See id. at 162 (describing how courts frame issue as whether government can protect 
information from being released to unauthorized individuals). 
107 Id. (arguing that “it is degrading when the government asks the question and collects 
the information in the first instance”). As Justice Brandeis noted in a dissent, “the right to be 
let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
108 Cf. BRIDGES, supra note 20 at 166 (describing how courts have not recognized “inter-
est that individuals . . . have in avoiding these harms to dignity”). 
109 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 208 
(2011); cf. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 77, at 195, 198 (“The common law secures to 
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, 
and emotions shall be communicated to others. Under our system of government, he can 
never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness-stand) . . . .”). 
110 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 162. 
111 See id. at 166 (displaying set of questions that women must answer for Medicaid that 
have little or nothing to do with health or parenting). 
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pulsions, and criminal convictions, it forces her to admit to a stigmatized social 
position.112 
Even if poor mothers have nothing embarrassing to reveal, the State’s inter-
rogations are corrosive. They tell poor mothers that they are the type of people 
who are likely to have stigmatizing information to reveal. The poor mother 
“may experience the interrogation as doubly painful both because it facilitates 
social control while at the same time revealing her as the type of person that 
society wants to control.”113 
II. A NEW PRIVACY 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights has the potential to shape the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of substantive due process protections owed to vulnera-
ble members of society. In an earlier age, the legal scholarship of Professor 
Charles Reich revolutionized our thinking about procedural due process pro-
tections afforded the indigent. Reich’s The New Property and related work 
published in the 1960s called for a “Bill of Rights for the disenfranchised.”114 
In Goldberg v. Kelly,115 the Court embraced Reich’s vision, recognizing proce-
dural due process protections for the indigent whose public benefits were in 
jeopardy of termination.116 Though the Court has not taken up Reich’s call for 
a constitutional right that would carve out a zone of privacy for the indigent,117 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights charts a theory for such a right. 
This Part explores the book’s parallels to Reich’s The New Property. It high-
lights the contributions that Professor Bridges makes to our understanding of 
the constitutional right to information privacy. The Poverty of Privacy Rights 
lays the groundwork for a “new privacy” by offering a more robust and contex-
tual understanding of the privacy rights at stake. This Part ends with sugges-
tions for the agenda at the heart of The Poverty of Privacy Rights, and urges us 
to look beyond the U.S. Constitution to address the erosion of privacy rights. 
A. The Scholarship of Charles Reich 
In 1964, Professor Charles Reich published The New Property, which pov-
erty law scholar David Super has described as “one of the most influential arti-
 
112 See id. at 167 (explaining how collecting private information from poor mothers can 
harm them even if they have nothing embarrassing to reveal). 
113 Id. at 168. 
114 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 760 (1964) (describing how 
oppressive government impairs individual’s enjoyment of rights). 
115 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
116 Id. at 271 (requiring that decision-maker’s conclusion as to welfare recipient’s eligi-
bility complies with certain procedural guidelines); see also Reich, supra note 114, at 783 
(describing how procedure provides strong safeguard against arbitrary government action). 
117 See Reich, supra note 114, at 785 (“[T]here must be a zone of privacy for each indi-
vidual beyond which neither government nor private power can push—a hiding from the all-
pervasive system of regulation and control.”). 
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cles of the last century.”118 The New Property explored the power of the ad-
ministrative state over individuals’ freedom.119 The State was a “gigantic sy-
phon,” dispensing entitlements that often took the “form of rights or status ra-
ther than of tangible goods.”120 As Reich explained, almost everyone received 
government entitlements, such as licenses, employment, contracts, tax breaks, 
and public benefits.121 The importance of those entitlements often exceeded 
that of traditional forms of wealth like homes or bank accounts.122 
Reich warned that the State acquired troubling power over citizens’ lives 
with the expansion of government entitlements.123 The more government 
“hands out something of value, whether a relief check or a television license,” 
the more power it has to supervise that aspect of people’s lives.124 The gov-
ernment investigated, monitored, and harassed recipients of its “largess[e].”125 
State interrogations were often expensive, embarrassing, and invasive.126 The 
state could affix a “black mark” on recipients that would haunt them far into 
the future.127 When subject to the State’s control, individuals had “no hiding 
place.”128 Not even the home was sacred—agencies frequently conducted mid-
night raids of benefits recipients’ residences.129 State surveillance and control 
impaired “individualism and independence.”130 
Individuals who defied the State’s conditions—no matter how arbitrary or 
invasive—could be punished with the suspension or revocation of government 
entitlements.131 Individuals could do little in response because entitlements 
 
118 Id. at 744; see David A. Super, The New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 
1779 (2013). 
119 See Reich, supra note 114, at 733. 
120 Id. at 733, 737-38. 
121 Id. at 739-46. 
122 See id. at 738-39 (describing that sources of income or rights to receive income are 
primary form of wealth dispensed by government and how this can be most meaningful dis-
tinctive wealth that individuals possess). 
123 See id. at 746 (noting that when government offers entitlements, it begins to supervise 
entitlement recipients). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 749-50 (providing examples of agencies using their powers arbitrarily with con-
stituents). 
126 See id. at 750 (explaining that use of surveillance alone would be enough to make 
people uncomfortable). 
127 Id. at 759-60. 
128 Id. at 760. 
129 See id. at 761 (explaining that Sunday mornings and after midnight were best for de-
tecting fraud through unannounced visits). 
130 Id. at 733. 
131 See id. at 747 (explaining that recipient’s moral character could be punished with de-
nial of government largesse). For example, licenses were denied longshoremen because they 
had criminal records and mothers were denied aid for their children because of their alleged 
bad character. Id.  
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were treated like gifts or privileges that were conditional and subject to the 
state’s discretion.132 For Reich, an antidote to the abuses of the “public interest 
state” would include the recognition of property rights in government entitle-
ments.133 Individuals needed to “possess, in whatever form, a small but sover-
eign island of his own” to protect their liberty.134 
Reich prescribed procedural and substantive protections of individuals’ 
property interests in government entitlements. He argued that scrupulous ob-
servance of fair procedures was essential to restrain arbitrary government ac-
tion.135 Then too, government should be prevented from using its largesse to 
“‘buy up’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”136 There should be “a zone of 
privacy for each individual beyond which neither government nor private pow-
er can push—a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and 
control.”137 Lastly, legislatures should ensure that the “regulation of largess[e]” 
does not “become a handle for regulating everything else.”138 
Reich argued that vulnerable members of society warranted particular atten-
tion.139 His scholarship argued that state power impacted groups differently, to 
the rich’s benefit and the poor’s disadvantage.140 Welfare regulation “im-
pose[d] a standard of moral behavior” that existed in no other area of govern-
ment entitlement.141 It subjected the poor to surveillance amounting to a “deep 
invasion of [their] freedom.”142 “It [was] only the poor whose entitlements, alt-
 
132 Cf. id. at 749 (noting that government could very easily rationalize increase in regula-
tion to accompany new entitlements). 
133 Id. at 778. 
134 Id. at 774. 
135 See id. at 783 (“Action should be open to hearing and contest, and based upon a rec-
ord subject to judicial review.”). David Super explains that “[a]lthough Reich advocated de-
veloping [procedural] rules for governments’ administration of largesse, he expressed great 
skepticism that they could rein in arbitrary power.” Super, supra note 118, at 1780.  
136 Reich, supra note 114, at 779. 
137 Id. at 785. 
138 Id. at 782. 
139 See id. at 777 (arguing that abrogating rights of poor for “the public interest is no jus-
tification for the erosion of freedom that has resulted from the present system of government 
largess”). 
140 See id. at 773 (discussing reforms in which corporations passed some power to gov-
ernment, creating system of “combined power” that “presses against the individual”). As 
Sarah Seo explains, Reich did not pay particular attention to how race or class “aggravated 
the problem of police discretion” in automobile stops. Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 125 
YALE L.J. 1616, 1645 (2016). However, he did acknowledge that “the police are far more 
likely to stop a Negro than a white man; far more likely to question a shabbily dressed man 
than one in an expensive suit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Charles A. 
Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1164 (1966)). 
141 Reich, supra note 24, at 1247. 
142 Reich, supra note 114, at 758. 
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hough recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.”143 Too 
often, government entitlements for the poor were treated as “charity” rather 
than as “essentials, fully deserved.”144 
In The New Property, a companion piece to Individual Rights and Social 
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, Reich argued that the recognition of 
property rights in public benefits was “urgently needed” to secure a “minimum 
basis for individual well-being and dignity.”145 Public benefits were no differ-
ent from government entitlements granted to wealthier segments of society.146 
They “aid security and independence” in the same way that professional li-
censes, farmers’ subsidies, and social security pensions do.147 Eligibility safe-
guards for welfare benefits and limits on the “visitorial powers of the state” 
were essential to ensure the poor’s liberty and self-respect.148 
B. Due Process Rights for the Poor 
Reich’s scholarship was profoundly influential. In Goldberg v. Kelly, decid-
ed in 1970, the Court addressed the procedures owed individuals before the 
State could terminate welfare benefits.149 Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, made clear that low-income people had the same procedural rights as 
the affluent.150 Citing Reich’s scholarship, the Court found that welfare bene-
fits were property interests protected by the Due Process Clause.151 Low-
income individuals had a right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard before the termination of welfare benefits, the same as any other gov-
ernment entitlement.152 The Court held that public benefits were not charity or 
 
143 Reich, supra note 24, at 1255. 
144 Id. 
145 Reich, supra note 114, at 785-86. 
146 See id. at 785 (“The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his 
license, and the welfare recipient his pension.”). 
147 Reich, supra note 24, at 1255. 
148 Id. at 1256. 
149 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970). 
150 Id. at 262 (citing Reich’s articles). 
151 See id. at 262-64 (noting importance of welfare to indigent persons that are qualified 
recipients). This is not to suggest that, following Goldberg, courts have been expansive in 
their understanding of the poor’s property rights, as Reich had hoped. As David Super ex-
plains, “[e]ven in procedural due process, defining which property rights are protected has 
proven continuously problematic.” Super, supra note 118, at 1828. The Court has had diffi-
culty shedding “the distinction between rights and privileges.” Id. Then too, courts have 
struggled with “how much of the legal, social, and economic context that gives rights their 
meaning should be included in the definitions of rights.” Id. at 1829. Also, courts have “al-
lowed legislatures to avoid creating property rights in public benefit programs with limita-
tions that are substantive in name only.” Id. 
152 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (requiring pre-termination evidentiary hearing to fulfill 
procedural due process requirements before welfare is terminated). 
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a “privilege,” but rather were a person’s property, such as state licenses, farmer 
subsidies, or corporate tax exemptions.153 
Reich’s call for procedural due process protections for the indigent was an-
swered in Goldberg. The question remained as to whether substantive due pro-
cess set limits on the State’s “all-pervasive” surveillance of the poor, as Reich 
had urged.154 In Whalen, decided six years after Goldberg, the Court alluded to 
a right to information privacy.155 Whalen and its progeny did not articulate a 
robust constitutional theory capable of addressing the pervasive surveillance of 
welfare recipients.156 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights is an important step towards a “bill of rights 
for the disinherited.”157 It provides a theory on which a right to information 
privacy for the vulnerable can be built. It imagines a substantive due process 
right that would limit or prohibit a state’s collection of personal data that 
serves no justifiable purpose and erodes individual dignity and liberty.158 It 
would “override the government’s interest in asking demeaning questions” if 
the answers would not advance the state’s legitimate interests.159 
A substantive right to information privacy, as developed in The Poverty of 
Privacy Rights, would have a structural impact. It would provide a “systemic-
type remedy to address system-wide harms.”160 It would say that poor mothers 
are citizens of the state, worthy of privacy and respect, rather than subjects of 
the State, deserving suspicion.161 Shielded from demeaning state interroga-
tions, uninsured, poor mothers would be put on equal footing to insured, 
 
153 Id. at 262 n.8. 
154 Reich, supra note 114, at 785 (calling for “zone of privacy” to protect individuals 
from government’s control). 
155 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (highlighting how duty to “avoid 
unwarranted disclosures” of certain personal information may have “its roots in the Consti-
tution” but not deciding whether such disclosure would be unconstitutional). 
156 See Reich, supra note 24, at 1254 (“[T]he law has not yet developed a constitutional 
theory of privacy fully adequate to the present-day interdependent world.”). 
157 Id. at 1257. 
158 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 167 (“[I]f our courts were concerned about protecting 
the dignity of all individuals in the polity, then the Constitution might be interpreted to re-
quire that the state only collect information that is necessary to determine the level of bene-
fits a person should receive and that facilitates her connection to other social services only if 
she desires that connection.”). 
159 Id. at 165. 
160 Hu, supra note 67, at 1797. Professor Margaret Hu argues that national security Big 
Data programs, such as the Terrorist Watch List and No Fly List, invade privacy on a mass, 
systemic scale and thus should be addressed with the systemic approach of substantive due 
process. See id. Her future scholarship will tackle the analytical framework of substantive 
due process for government’s big data scoring, ranking, and rating programs. See id. at 
1798. 
161 Cf. BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 166 (highlighting shame associated with forcing poor 
mothers to reveal personal information). 
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wealthier mothers who are not similarly interrogated.162 Preserving a poor 
mother’s right to privacy would “produce an equality of treatment between 
poor and non-poor mothers, even when the narratives that are told about the 
two sets of mothers are far from equal.”163 
A constitutional right to information privacy has the potential to impact 
democratic participation. Respecting privacy would further individual autono-
my and democratic participation by ensuring that people see themselves as ca-
pable of self-governance.164 The State would be precluded from engaging in 
interrogations that disenfranchise poor mothers more than they already are. 
C. Beyond the Constitution 
The Constitution is a crucial tool to address the erosion of the poor’s privacy 
rights, but it is not the only tool. The tendency to reify the Constitution can 
prevent the pursuit of other fruitful avenues for reform.165 Positive law, state 
constitutions, and corporate practices can help protect poor mothers’ privacy 
and freedom as well.166 
A reform agenda should include the offices of state attorneys general. State 
enforcers have been active privacy norm entrepreneurs since the late 1990s.167 
They have pioneered baseline privacy norms to protect their citizens, relying 
on unfair and deceptive acts and practice (“UDAP”) laws.168 Several offices 
have devoted resources to investigating Big Data efforts that disadvantage the 
poor.169 In my scholarship, I have called on state enforcers to “investigate un-
fair and deceptive uses of scoring algorithms given their potential to further 
marginalize vulnerable populations.”170 
 
162 Cf. id. (calling attention to fact that wealthy mothers do not face same questioning and 
regulation as poor mothers). 
163 Id. at 169. 
164 See Brief for Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011) (No. 09-530) (explain-
ing that right to informational self-determination “prevents any processing of personal data 
that leads to an inspection of or an influence upon a person that is capable of destroying an 
individual capacity for self-governance”). 
165 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Essential Preconditions to Digi-
tal Expression (You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1375-85 (2018) (dis-
cussing other avenues for reform). 
166 Id. 
167 See Citron, supra note 11, at 749 (outlining involvement of state attorneys general 
with privacy enforcement since the 1990s). 
168 Id. at 750-54 (giving overview of efforts of state attorneys general to enforce privacy 
norms). 
169 See id. at 809-10 (noting certain uses of big data that should be on agendas of state 
attorneys general, such as unfair and deceptive uses of scoring algorithms and cell phone 
apps for stalking). 
170 Id. at 810. 
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Although state attorney general (“AG”) privacy policymaking tends to focus 
on private uses of personal data, it can address the state’s aggregation of un-
necessary and embarrassing personal data. State AG offices could look to state 
constitutions to challenge state regulations requiring the collection of extrane-
ous—and stigmatizing—personal data from indigent mothers. 
California’s AG office would have strong support for such a challenge.171 
Article I of the California Constitution guarantees to all people the inalienable 
right to privacy.172 The privacy provision was added to the state constitution 
pursuant to a ballot initiative aimed to curtail overbroad and unnecessary col-
lections of personal data.173 The provision addressed the “accelerating en-
croachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance 
and data collection activity in contemporary society.”174 As the California Su-
preme Court has held, the state needs to show a compelling interest to justify 
invading “autonomy-based privacy rights, particularly in the areas of free ex-
pression and association, procreation, or government-provided benefits in areas 
of basic human need.”175 The California Supreme Court held that a law requir-
ing public employees to submit to polygraph testing to investigate specific 
crimes violated employees’ privacy rights under the state constitution.176 
 
171 So too would private litigants. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
77, 86 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that Target’s use of psychological profiling device that re-
quired job applicants to answer questions about religious beliefs and sexual orientation vio-
lated applicants’ privacy rights under state constitution). 
172 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 
479 (Cal. 2009) (holding that right to privacy applies to state actors and private parties). 
173 See CAL. BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND INITIATIVES, PROPOSITION 11: RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
27 (UC Hastings Scholarship Repository 1972). California state senator James E. Whitmore 
opposed the initiative because he believed it would make it more difficult for the govern-
ment to investigate welfare fraud. Id. at 27-28. The ballot’s key legislative proponents ar-
gued that “[p]roposition 11 will not prevent the government from collecting any information 
it legitimately needs. It will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized pur-
poses and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information.” Id. at 28 (empha-
sis added).  
174 White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 (Cal. 1975). 
175 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 663 (Cal. 1994). The California 
Supreme Court has employed a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, when the privacy 
interest does not infringe on autonomy or when the data collection does not concern public 
benefits in areas of basic need. Id. at 678. For example, in Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 
1011 (Cal. 2017), the court upheld the state medical board’s access to a patients’ prescrip-
tion records in an investigation of a doctor. The court held that even assuming the board’s 
actions constituted a serious intrusion on a legally protected privacy interest, the State’s ac-
cess to the doctor’s prescription records was justified by their interest in protecting the pub-
lic from the unlawful sale of dangerous drugs and protecting patients from negligent physi-
cians. Id. at 1014. 
176 Long Beach City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1986). 
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State attorneys general also can influence government data collection prac-
tices through the legislative process.177 They could call for state legislation cur-
tailing the collection of personal information from poor mothers.  State legisla-
tures should amend laws requiring poor mothers to answer demeaning 
questions that have nothing to do with prenatal care or successful parenting.178 
State legislation limiting the collection of personal data from poor mothers 
would be crucial for expressive reasons. Law is our teacher and guide.179 It 
shapes social norms and behavior.180 Revisions of state regulations would in-
form providers of state Medicaid programs that poor mothers should neither be 
suspected of, nor interrogated about, stigmatizing behavior. Changes in state 
laws could transform culture, which in turn could influence courts to interpret 
due process “to bestow equal privacy rights to poor and wealthier mothers.”181 
As Professor Bridges explains, “if history is a teacher, poor mothers will only 
be granted privacy rights when cultural discourses around poverty shift as 
well.”182 State lawmakers can help root out the moral construction of poverty. 
Another avenue of reform involves front line workers responsible for wel-
fare surveillance. Social workers and medical staff are entrusted with the task 
of interrogating poor mothers.183 Due to the moral construction of poverty, 
they may end up collecting far more personal data than the law requires.184 
Their interrogations of poor mothers can be deeply humiliating.185 Bridges re-
calls an interview with a pregnant, poor woman who had several tattoos.186 The 
first thing the doctor asked the woman was if her tattoo provider used clean 
needles.187 The patient was devastated—the doctor’s question implied she was 
the type of person who would go to an unlicensed, back alley tattoo provid-
er.188 
 
177 Citron, supra note 11, at 758. 
178 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 2-6. 
179 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 22-26 (2014) (arguing 
that legal reforms spearheaded by civil rights activists have resulted in societal change); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2009) [hereinafter Citron, Law’s Expressive Value] (“Law cre-
ates a public set of meanings and shared understandings between the state and the public. It 
clarifies, and draws attention to, the behavior it prohibits. . . . Law educates the public about 
what is socially harmful.”). 
180 Citron, supra note 179, at 407. 
181 BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 209-11. 
182 Id. at 209. 
183 See id. at 163-65 (describing experience of interrogation and data collection of one 
pregnant black patient). 
184 See id. at 166-67 (describing wide range of information that would be gathered from 
such interrogations). 
185 See id. at 163-65. 
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187 Id. at 163. 
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Hospitals should include the moral construction of poverty in its training of 
personnel. Staff should be taught about poverty bias and its corrosive impact 
on patient care. Had the doctor been aware of the tendency to impute bad char-
acter to poor mothers, the doctor might not have asked the needless and embar-
rassing questions about the woman’s tattoo provider. 
Progress is more likely if executives, lawmakers, and law enforcers view the 
protection of poor mothers’ privacy rights as serving their interests. As Profes-
sor Derrick Bell has counseled, civil rights progress is most likely to occur 
when the interests of vulnerable people can be aligned with those in the domi-
nant group.189 Addressing poverty bias is in hospitals’ interest because humili-
ating questions shake a patient’s trust in medical providers.190 Without trust, 
patients will be less inclined to share personal information essential for effec-
tive care. This lack of information can lead to bad medical outcomes and law-
suits, which hospitals and medical providers want to avoid. 
Just as hospitals have some incentive to combat the moral construction of 
poverty, so too might state lawmakers and law enforcers. Data privacy is a 
pressing concern for constituents.191 The unraveling of privacy is underway in 
the health arena.192 Employers provide incentives to employees who agree to 
submit health data as part of wellness programs.193 Employees who refuse to 
permit the collection of their health data are penalized because they are as-
sumed to be withholding negative information, like a smoking habit.194 Viewed 
 
189 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE 63-74 (1987) (explaining that progress on racial issues depends on ability to con-
vince whites that they will benefit from social justice agenda); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber 
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 84-85 (2009) (heeding Professor Bell’s advice and arguing 
that society suffers when law is brought to bear against online attacks that disproportionate-
ly impact women, people of color, and sexual minorities). Mary Anne Franks’s important 
work has leveraged Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory to argue that the emerging 
anti-surveillance sentiment should be transformed into what she calls “enlightened interest 
convergence” that would seek to protect the privacy interests of the vulnerable. Mary Anne 
Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 430 (2016). As Professor 
Franks notes, a “democratic conception of privacy, by emphasizing the experiences of those 
most vulnerable to its violation, offers the best chance of securing privacy for all.” Id. 
190 See BRIDGES, supra note 20, at 163-65 (describing one woman’s reluctance to go to 
doctor because of humiliation related to interrogation procedures). 
191 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 11, at 786-90 (exploring how constituents have serious 
concerns about data breaches, identity theft, children’s privacy, unwanted telephone calls, 
and other privacy and security issues). 
192 Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Piracy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a 
Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2011) (“The [healthcare] field has 
had the luxury of ignoring unraveling because technologies did not exist to make a signaling 
economy possible. Those days are over.”). 
193 See id. at 1167-69 (discussing phenomenon of digital monitoring and employer pro-
grams to incentivize employees to participate by providing health information). 
194 See id. at 1156. Health insurance companies may insist upon the adoption of health 
monitoring technologies to pass on the costs of nonconforming behavior like smoking. See 
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in this way, everyone—from the poor to the affluent—may come to see that 
they could be subject to invasive data collection. 
Ultimately, the protection of poor mothers’ privacy rights could serve as a 
step towards the protection of everyone’s privacy. It could force broader con-
versations about the data collection imperative, to which we now turn. 
III. LAW, CONTEXT, AND RECIPROCITY 
Rather than adopting technologies and techniques of perfect surveillance 
and asking questions later, a systematic review of the data collection impera-
tive is in order. The Poverty of Privacy Rights brings into view several thresh-
old questions. Should the data collection imperative be permitted to continue 
without end? What data collection efforts deserve careful study because they 
risk abuse and exact costs to dignity, liberty, and democracy? 
This Part briefly considers these broader questions in light of the govern-
ment’s collection of personal data to protect against crimes, hazards, and ter-
rorism. It discusses the role of the Fourth Amendment in limiting state surveil-
lance designed to prevent and punish crimes and terrorism. Then, it considers 
the role of reciprocity in evaluating the data collection imperative. 
A. Technologies of Perfect Surveillance 
Since 9/11, government has significantly expanded surveillance over indi-
viduals’ everyday lives. As Professor David Gray astutely observed in The 
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Surveillance, the goal “seems to be complete, 
pervasive surveillance of everywhere we go in virtual and physical space, eve-
rything we do, everything we say, and everything we think.”195 Everyone is at 
risk of state surveillance given the detailed data trail continuously created 
about all of us.196 The “National Surveillance State”—as Jack Balkin calls it—
is “statistically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than focused on deter-
rence and ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing.”197 
To illustrate domestic-surveillance techniques, government agents and pri-
vate-sector partners collect and share information and intelligence through a 
network of fusion centers.198 With an “all hazards, all crimes, all threats” man-
 
id. at 1168-69 (“Some employers have tracked employees’ smoking habits even when the 
employees are away from their place of work. Some have fired employees who engage in 
behavior likely to raise the employer’s health insurance costs.”). 
195 DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 5 (2017). 
196 See FERGUSON, supra note 9, at 5 (warning that everyone is under surveillance and at 
risk of big data policing). 
197 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2008). 
198 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1448 (defining “fusion centers” as “novel 
sites of intergovernmental collaboration that generate and share intelligence and infor-
mation”). 
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date, “fusion centers cast a wide and indiscriminate net.”199 Fusion centers uti-
lize private entities to gather personal information for them.200 Data brokers 
specially design databases containing dossiers on hundreds of millions of 
Americans for “fusion centers.”201 Data-mining tools analyze personal data 
culled from public and private databases, biometric data, social media posts, 
and public and private cameras.202 
Governments employ technologies that continuously and indiscriminately 
collect personal data. For instance, cell site simulators, known as “stingrays,” 
“impersonate the cellular base stations that form the backbone of provider net-
works. . . . [T]hese devices can gather information from every cellular phone 
within their ranges of operation—often hundreds or thousands of phones at a 
time.”203 Cell site simulators enable law enforcement to “learn the unique iden-
tification numbers associated with each of these phones, their locations, and 
basic information about communications and callers.”204 For most city dwell-
ers, being tracked by a cell site simulator is routine.205 
The more power the State acquires with surveillance technologies and tech-
niques, the more Americans need protections that check that power.206 State 
surveillance can lead to incorrect predictions about individuals that have a pro-
found negative impact on their lives.207 As Reich warned fifty years ago, state 
surveillance can create a “black mark” on someone’s record from which one 
can never escape.208 It can demean and stigmatize, as The Poverty of Privacy 
Rights illustrated.209 It can interfere with projects of personal exploration, self-
 
199 Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A 
Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 264 (2013) (citation omitted). 
200 See id.  
201 Id. 
202 See id. 
203 GRAY, supra note 195, at 4. 
204 Id. at 5. 
205 Id. (noting that neighborhoods designated as “high crime” areas are routinely moni-
tored). 
206 Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1444-55 (discussing how lack of oversight in 
domestic intelligence information sharing hubs erodes civil liberties); Richards, supra note 
14, at 1952-58 (discussing potential injuries suffered by public as result of intellectual pri-
vacy infringement). 
207 See Hu, supra note 68, at 1777-88 (discussing, for example, poor reliability of data-
bases that inform screening protocols).  
208 See Reich, supra note 114, at 759-80 (discussing consequences of criminal convic-
tion). For thoughtful explorations of privacy harms in the digital age, see SOLOVE, supra 
note 5; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET (2007). 
209 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
  
2018] A POOR MOTHER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1163 
 
development, and democratic culture.210 Government databases are subject to 
data breaches that risk considerable financial harm and cause anxiety.211 Mas-
sive state collections of personal data can metastasize to countless other data-
bases run by federal, state, and local agencies.212 
A defining question is whether government will “protect[] individual dignity 
and conform[] both public and private surveillance to the rule of law.”213 The 
Fourth Amendment stands as a “critical bulwark[]” against abusive state sur-
veillance.214 But legal doctrines have undermined the Fourth Amendment’s ef-
ficacy by allowing law enforcement to track individuals in public and to obtain 
third-party records without a warrant.215 In Carpenter v. United States,216 the 
Supreme Court reinvigorated the Fourth Amendment’s protections in finding 
that the government needed a warrant to obtain cell site location data from the 
defendant’s wireless carrier. For the Court, there was a qualitative difference 
between analog records and digital technologies. The Court underscored that 
cell phone location information generated by wireless carriers are “detailed, 
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”217 The Court thus declined to extend 
the third-party doctrine to the case due to the “unique nature of cell phone lo-
cation records.”218 According to the Court, when the government “leverages 
the technology of a wireless carrier,” individuals have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the record of their physical movements in public.219 The govern-
ment conducted a search when it accessed cell site location data because the 
tracking technology enabled perfect surveillance of a person’s whereabouts far 
back in time.220 In concluding its findings, the Court harkened back to Justice 
 
210 See, e.g., Citron & Gray, supra note 199, at 269-70 (illustrating how technological 
information gathering “facilitates the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is 
characteristic of a surveillance state”). 
211 See Solove & Citron, supra note 65, at 738 (outlining various types of harm that re-
sult from data breach). 
212 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1484-87 (explaining scope of “network ac-
countability” problem). 
213 Balkin, supra note 197, at 4. 
214 GRAY, supra note 195, at 69. 
215 See Balkin, supra note 197, at 19-20 (outlining various instances of government sur-
veillance that were held to fall outside Fourth Amendment protection). A case decided by 
the Supreme Court this Term called into question the presumption that information collected 
by private parties can be provided to the government without Fourth Amendment re-
strictions. Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) 
(No. 16-402). 
216 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
217 Id. at 2216. 
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Brandeis’s prescient dissent in Olmstead v. United States,221 which called for 
vigilance to ensure that the “progress of science” did not erode Fourth 
Amendment protections.222 
Crucial to the Court’s decision was the method of surveillance—whether 
digital technology permits “perfect surveillance” tantamount to the general 
warrant and writs of assistance that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment ab-
horred.223 In a series of articles, David Gray and I argued that the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections are implicated when the government uses technolo-
gies or investigative techniques that facilitate a broad, continuous, and indis-
criminate collection of personal data that intrudes upon reasonable expecta-
tions of quantitative privacy.224 The government’s use of such technologies or 
techniques would amount to a “search,” subject to the crucible of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness, including judicially enforced constraints on law 
enforcement’s discretion.225 The Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter af-
firmed the substance of our argument and found that the Fourth Amendment 
stands as a bulwark against technologies of perfect surveillance.  
Might the constitutional right to information privacy serve as a check on 
surveillance technologies or techniques that facilitate broad, indiscriminate, 
and continuous collection of personal data? Due process would limit or block 
surveillance programs that serve no legitimate state purpose beyond the State’s 
exertion of control over people’s lives.226 Challenges to surveillance programs 
would face the classic argument that needles cannot be found without the hay-
stack.227 Some surveillance programs, however, have been shown to produce 
 
221 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
222 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-474 (Brandeis, J., 
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223 See id. at 2218. 
224 See Citron & Gray, supra note 199, at 270 (discussing history and significance of the 
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tered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 404-05 (2013) (discussing effect of mosaic theory on 
traditional human surveillance); David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, 
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745 
(2013); Gray & Citron, supra note 4, at 71-72 (“Rather than asking how much information 
is gathered in a particular case, we argue here that Fourth Amendment interests in quantita-
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225 See Gray & Citron, supra note 4, at 71-72. 
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that informational privacy is protected by due process). 
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devoted to detecting and preventing crimes and threats through analyzing information, 
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little value, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found of the 
NSA’s bulk telephone records program.228 
Professor Hu has argued that substantive due process should serve as a 
check on government’s use of Big Data programs that deprive people of im-
portant rights.229 As Hu carefully documents, classified and non-classified 
government programs categorize individuals as “administratively ‘guilty until 
proven innocent’ by virtue of suspicious digital data and database screening 
results.”230 As a result of “big data blacklisting,” people are deemed ineligible 
to work, vote, and travel.231 Hu contends that substantive due process should 
interrogate the “propriety of the mediation of a fundamental right in the first 
instance.”232 Hu’s future work will explore whether a compelling state purpose 
justifies “big data blacklisting” programs that imperil liberty.233 
The constitutional right to information privacy could serve as a check on 
government’s collection and use of personal data in the national surveillance 
state.234 It raises important questions about the data collection imperative, 
which underlies government’s use of technologies of perfect surveillance to 
investigate crimes, hazards, and terrorism. The data collection imperative is 
behind countless other surveillance projects in the private and public sector.235 
Careful thought must be given to the benefits and costs of these projects and 
the need, if any, for judicial, legislative, or administrative constraints before 
their adoption. 
 
228 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REP. ON THE TEL. RECORDS PROGRAM  16 
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230 Id. at 1747. 
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233 See id. at 1798 (“[F]uture scholarship on this subject will explore the analytical 
framework of substantive due process in the context of the mass harms of big data blacklist-
ing.”). 
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B. Reciprocity 
Best practices and law often pair concerns about privacy with a commitment 
to transparency and accountability.236 That tradition is built on a commitment 
of reciprocity.237 When the State invades citizens’ privacy, it owes citizens a 
reciprocal duty of transparency and accountability about its processes and de-
cisions.238 The idea is to “watch the watchers.”239 The Privacy Act of 1974240 
and the Freedom of Information Act241 embody the commitment of reciprocity 
for the administrative state. 
There is a flip side to reciprocity. What happens as government shields its 
activities from view and loses any semblance of accountability? We have seen 
trends pointing in that direction. In some states, police disciplinary records are 
protected from public disclosure while criminal records plague citizens long 
after their time has been served.242 Privatization often obscures what individual 
officials did or decided.243 State surveillance is certainly most troubling—and 
 
236 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 68, at 1471 (“America has a tradition of combining 
concerns about privacy with guarantees of government openness.”). The Fair Information 
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individual police officers); see also Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Public 
Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1074 (2016) (outlining 
heightened scrutiny that subpoenas for police records typically face when challenged in 
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most hostile to the rule of law—when it amasses vast amounts of information 
about citizens while shrouding the State’s operations in secrecy.244 
As we take stock of the data collection imperative, concepts of reciprocity 
should inform our evaluation. Concepts of reciprocity force into consideration 
the disproportionate power acquired by government as it amasses reservoirs of 
personal data about each and every one of us.245 Might reciprocity demand that 
individuals have the right to be as unknown to government as it is to them? 
Hints of a right not to be known have been recognized in some areas of the 
law. For instance, the Supreme Court supported the NAACP’s efforts to keep 
its membership lists away from segregationist state and local officials, finding 
the right to avoid government scrutiny an integral part of the right of associa-
tion.246 
A right to be unknown would not be unlimited. Like other individual rights, 
it could be overcome by compelling, specific claims of public necessity or by 
an individual’s deliberate waiver of her privacy. But requiring government to 
justify its surveillance or to show that individuals have surrendered their right 
to be unknown would have the effect of requiring more focused, and less intru-
sive, data gathering.247 
CONCLUSION 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights powerfully advances the project of securing 
privacy for the most vulnerable among us. It shows how the moral construction 
of poverty animates the State’s surveillance of poor mothers, rather than legit-
imate concerns about prenatal care. State surveillance dispossesses poor moth-
ers of their dignity and capacity for self-governance. Professor Bridges offers a 
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richer, contextual account of the constitutional right to information privacy that 
would limit the State’s collection of personal data. Individuals have the right 
not to be known if the State’s questions would demean and humiliate them for 
no good reason. 
The Poverty of Privacy Rights provides an important lens for rethinking the 
data collection imperative more generally. It supplies a theory not only on 
which a right to information privacy can be built but also on which positive 
law and norms can develop. Concepts of reciprocity may provide another ana-
lytical tool to understand a potential right to be as unknown to government as it 
is to us. 
 
